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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASES 
The plaintiffs in the above case seek to cancel a con-
tract of sale whereby Arthur N. Grover Farms Inc. a 
1 
Utah corporation sold on contract for the sum of 
$186,535.00, certain farm lands, water-rights and graz-
ing rights located in the State of Idaho, to the defend-
ants. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,iVER COURT 
Respondents adopt the statement made by appel-
lants in their brief as to the disposition in lower court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to have the appellate court sus-
tain the lower court in its decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We do not agree with plaintiffs' Statement of 
Facts. Our Statement of Facts is as follows: 
Arthur N. Grover and his wife Estella V. Grover 
were the owners of certain dry-farm lands in Idaho in 
what is known as Pocatello Valley, just across the Utah 
line. They formed a corpora ti on known as Arthur N. 
Grover Farms Inc. and transferred to their corporation 
the title to their lands. They did so under the guidance 
of their attorney E. J. Skeen in the year 1963. In order 
to comply with the legal requirements of three incorpo-
rators, they used the name of Fay G. Wight, one of their 
daughters, who resided in the State of California as the 
third incorporator. This corporation was formed as 
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shown by the Articles (Exhibit #10) on the 1st day of 
.March, 1963. The Articles provided (Article 4) for 
authority to issue 100 shares of stock. The stockbook 
(Exhibit #g) shows that there were three certificates of 
stock issued September 20, 1963. The first certificate 
was to Fay G. Wight for one share, the second certifi-
cate to Estella V. Grover for 45 shares and the third 
certificate for 45 shares to Arthur N. Grover. 
The record further shows Fay G. 1Vight did not 
receive the certificate of stock for the one share issued 
by the corporation (see answer to Interrogatories in 
Civil File # 10081 being answer to Interrogatory #I) 
until about August, 1965. Also, according to Fay G. 
1Vight and Attorney E. J. Skeen, when the corporation 
was first organized Fay G. 'Vight, as president of the 
corporation, signed in blank for her father (R. 120, 781, 
782) all the certificates of stock in the stockbook. This 
would then make it possible for her parents to issue stock 
to whomever they wanted, without contacting her. By 
this act she literally placed the full control of the cor-
poration in the hands of her father and mother because 
they had a stock book signed completely in blank by their 
daughter Fay G. 'Vight, as president. The one share to 
the daughter was not delivered to her. Her certificate 
could be canceled at any time and a new certificate is-
sued by the use of the blank certificates that she had 
signed and left with her parents. 
Thereafter the father filed with the Secretary of 
State. pursuant to Section 16-10-121 of the Utah Busi-
3 
ness Corporation Act, the first annual report on the 2nd 
day of March, 1964. This was signed by him before a 
notary, being Nancy Lee Bishop the secretary of E. J. 
Skeen the attorney who had prepared the Articles of 
Incorporation (Defendants' Exhibit #10). This affida-
vit stated that 91 shares of stock had been issued as of 
that date. He again, on August 2nd, 1965, filed a second 
annual report under oath setting out that 92 shares had 
been issued in said corporation as of that date. The 
stockbook does not agree with these affidavits. The first 
three certificates equal 91 shares. These three certifi-
cates would equal the number of shares claimed issued 
on the first annual report as of March 2nd, 1964, filed 
with the Secretary of State. However, the stockbook 
certificate #4 shows one share of stock issued to Leonard 
Grover dated September 24, 1963. Certificate #5 shows 
one share of stock issued to Dr. Floyd E. Grover dated 
September 24, 1963. Certificate #6 shows one share of 
stock issued to Amy G. Jensen dated September 24, 
1963. Certificate #7 shows one share of stock issued to 
A. Norman Grover dated September 24, 1963. Certifi-
cate #8 shows one share of stock issued to Max L. Grov-
er dated September 24, 1963. Certificate #10 shows one 
share of stock issued to Joyce Anna Smith dated Sep-
tember 24, 1963. These certificates so issued make a 
total of 98 shares issued, all in the month of September, 
1963, when the affidavits filed under oath show 91 
shares as of March, 1964, and 92 shares as of August, 
1965. 
The court found (R. 880, 881) that no stock was 
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owned by other than the father and mother on the date 
of sale to the defendants Garn, to-wit: October lst 
' 
1964, which supported the contention of the defendant 
that the certificates shown issued in the stockbook were 
made up at a later date and back-dated for the purpose 
of assisting the plaintiffs in their cause of action. 
A close examination of the stock book (Exhibit #9) 
shows there are only stubs for twenty-three certificates, 
a peculiar number for a bound stockbook. Also, in the 
binding in the back there appears to show a small part 
of a stub still remaining after the major portion of it 
has been torn out. Also, certificate number 19 is dated 
l\fay 16, 1964, while certificates numbers 11 to 18 in-
clusive, are dated July 16, 1964, which further indicates 
someone was mixed-up when this stockbook manipula-
tion was attempted . 
. Mr. Grover had farmed this property alone or with 
the aid of tenants for many years prior to the year 1964. 
However he had decided to sell, and had listed his prop-
erty for sale on the 22nd day of October, 1963 (Exhibit 
#31). He had also told other people about his desire to 
sell this property, one of whom was Charles Wood ( R. 
6, 226, 227) and as a result of this information Oleen 
Garn, one of the defendants, went to see the property in 
Idaho and met Arthur N. Grover upon the property. 
This occurred in September of 1964 ( R. 7). 
Mr. Grover showed Oleen Garn over the property 
and quoted him certain prices (R. 8). They arranged a 
second meeting and .Mr. Garn and his two sons, the 
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other two named defendants in this law suit, returned 
and were shown the Grover property by .Mr. Grover. 
Again, they discussed a purchase price of $140.00 per 
acre for the tillable dry-farm ground which had been pre-
viously placed in crop. l\Ir. Grover asked no down pay-
ment but did request an annual payment. A $15,000.00 
figure was discussed which would include the range 
ground, water and Taylor Grazing rights. The Garns 
could have borrowed the money and paid him in full in 
one payment, but he stated his attorney had advised him 
to sell it in the manner he outlined. Mr. Grover said he 
wanted a low rate of interest, 3%, and a high price per 
acre for tax purposes. He also said he wanted his pay-
ments based upon one half (1/2) of the crop. He asked 
for a down payment of only $10.00 to show good faith. 
Mr. Grover was to go back to Salt Lake and have his 
attorney draw up a contract of sale and the Garns were 
to meet him in the off ice of the First Security Bank in 
Brigham City, Utah (R. 9, 11, 12, 533, 537, 625, 626, 
627, 628, 629, 630, Exhibit 40). 
A working copy of some agreement was later taken 
by Mr. Grover to the :First Security Bank where Mr. 
J. Leo Nelson, one of the officers, met with Mr. Grover 
and the Garns and the terms of the first contract pre-
pared by the Attorney for l\fr. Grover, E. J. Skeen, 
were discussed. There was also discussion about the 
property being owned by a corporation, and, the fact 
that the corporation had 91 shares of stock issued, 45 
shares to Mr. Grover, 45 shares to Mrs. Grover and one 
share to a daughter named Fay G. Wight. Mr. Grover, 
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at that time, appeared very alert, and fully able to un-
derstand what he was doing and saying. 
This first contract had no minimum payment pro-
vided in the contract, and on the advice of the banker 
there were some changes made. Mr. Grover said he 
wanted to convey 120 acres of the land to a daughter, 
and as this was agreeable to all parties the contract was 
taken back to .Mr. Grover's attorney E. J. Skeen, to 
make the final corrections. It was then to be returne<l 
for signatures. 
On the 26th day of September, 1964, .Mr. Grover 
either drove or had somneone drive him to the Garns' 
home in Fielding, where he presented to the three Garns 
a contract which he had apparently had prepared and 
requested the Garns to sign it, which they did. He said 
that Mr. Skeen was out of his office and the final draft 
was not finished but he wanted this signed while await-
ing the final draft (Exhibit 33, R. 12, 13, 14, 15, 540, 
542, 543, 544, 546, 547, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635 and 636). 
On or about the 1st day of October, 1964, the Garns 
were advised by .Mr. Grover to come to the First Se-
curity Bank at Brigham City, for the purpose of signing 
the contract of sale. When the Garns arrived, Norman 
Grover, a son of Arthur N. Grover, was in the back room 
of the bank with his father. 'Vhen the father came out 
of the back room with Norman Grover, Norman Grover 
left without talking to the Ganrs. (R. 18, 19, 351, 548, 
549, 637.) The contract which had been made up in At-
torney Skeen's office (Exhibit #3) and two warranty 
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deeds of conveyance also f'repared in the same off ice 
and notarized by Nancy Lee Bishop, the secretary of 
Attorney Skeen, were al~o there (Exhibits 2 and 5) as 
well as an escrow agreement prepared on a different 
typewriter (Exhibit # 1) . Present were Arthur N. 
Grover, the three Garns and their wives and J. Leo N el-
son the banker. Estella V. Grover was not present but 
the instruments which required her signature had been 
previously signed by her (R. 20, 21, 22, 23, 553, 638, 
639). 
The escrow agreement (Exhibit # 1) provid-
ed on its reverse side that after the payment of 
certain charges the balance of any payments on said 
contract would be credited to the account of Arthur 
N. Grover and Estella V. Grover. Obviously the 
money to be paid to the Grovers was requested to be 
made available to them individually, just as though there 
were no corporation in existence. The legal instruments 
were all signed at that time at the First Security Bank 
by the Garns and Arthur N. Grover and were left in 
escrow with the bank ( R. 18) on or about October 1st, 
1964. 
Arthur N. Grover was so pleased with this sale that he 
sent a check in the sum of $500.00 marked "in apprecia-
tion" to Charles Wood (R. 228) because Mr. Wood had 
referred the Garns to him to make the sale. 
Various members of the Grover family came to the 
farm in August of 1965, one year after the date of the 
sale (R. 41, 42) and Mr. Grover was with them. All 
were happy regarding the sale to the Garns. 
8 
The first defector was Norman Grover. He met 
Darvel Garn after contracts had been executed and the 
Garns had gone into possession and were planting wheat 
in October of 1964. (R. 639, 640, 641). He wanted them 
to move off. The following spring Norman Grover and 
his brother Max, went to the farm (R. 37, 38, 39, 353, 
354, 355) and demanded the Garns walk off. He fol-
lowed this up with a meeting at the Cross Roads Service 
Station east of Tremonton, Utah, where he met the 
father, Oleen Garn, in September of 1965 (R. 55, 356, 
357). He admitted he didn't have any stock in the cor-
poration but said he was representing his father, Arthur 
N. Grover, and they were going to take the farm back 
and kick the Garns off. He followed this up with a meet-
ing a month later at the same place. This was called at 
his request. This time there was present Oleen Garn, 
his son, Clive Garn and Norman Grover (R. 56, 57, 
359, 360, 566, 567). At this meeting Norman Grover 
was confronted with the fact that at the prior meeting he 
said he owned no stock and that he was just represent-
ing his father, Arthur N. Grover and to that Norman 
Grover replied: 
"That's the way it was then, but it's not the 
case now and if you don't get off we're going to 
take legal action and throw you off." 
Evidently the new stock issue shown in the stockbook 
took place between these two meetings in October and 
November of 1965. 
Between these two meetings mentioned above an-
other meeting took place during October, 1965, at the 
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request of the father, Arthur N. Grover, at hi~ home in 
Salt Lake City (R. 58, 59, 562, 563, 564, 641, 642, 643). 
There he had a paper to read to the Garns claiming in 
substance that the income tax on the sale would cost him 
from $130,000.00 to $140,000.00 according to his son, 
Norman Grover, and that he would have to take the 
farm back. At this meeting Estella V. Grover served 
some ice cream and showed the lady folks some pictures. 
A new meeting was set up at the First Security Bank in 
Brigham City, the following Monday (R. 60, 563, 644). 
Norman Grover was there with hi~ father and claimed 
his father would have to pay $140,000.00 in taxes on the 
sale. The Grovers refused to have an attorney come in 
and determine the amount of tax. The meeting broke up. 
On December 31, 1965, Norman Grover filed Civil 
Action #10038 on the Garns. He had contacted Attor-
ney Skeen (R. 361) and Attorney Skeen prepared the 
complaint for Norman Grover (R. 395, 396, 397) but 
for some reason did not sign it as the attorney. 'Vhile 
he had personally prepared the original contract for the 
sale of Arthur N. Grover Farms Inc. and had advised 
Mr. Arthur N. Grover during the negotiations, he at 
this time alleged in the complaint that the price was so 
inadequate and the interest rate so low that the sale was 
unconscionable and unfair to the seller (R. 396). How-
ever that same complaint prepared by E. J. Skeen (R. 
845) for Norman Grover did not allege any incompe-
tency on the part of either Arthur N. Grover or Estella 
V. Grover (R. 845, 846, 847). 
At the time of the trial, Attorney Clifford L. Ash-
10 
ton made a great attempt to have Arthur N. Grover, 
one of his clients who was also the secretary-treasurer 
of the corporation at the time of sale, brought in as an 
adverse witness, (R. 70, 71, 73) alleging incompetency. 
There was considerable argument on this point so the 
court called him as its witness. Then Attorney Ashton 
immediately guided this witness into a claimed incident 
(R. 76) which was supposed to have taken place on Sep-
tember 26, 1964. It was claimed that Mr. Arthur N. 
Grover had tried to crank a tractor and had blacked out 
when either the tractor backfired and the crank hit him 
or he had suffered a heart attack. He claimed he laid 
there six or seven hours before his son-in-law, who was 
deceased at the time of trial, found him (R. 77). He also 
claimed that he was paralyzed from his waist down, that 
the son-in-law found his tonic that he kept on hand and 
gave it to him and that he bathed his legs in cold water, 
then in alcohol for three hours and then in the evening 
took him to Salt Lake City. He also claimed that on 
the following day Oleen Garn telephoned Arthur N· 
Grover (R. 78) and said he had heard that Mr. Garn 
wanted to sell his property. 
Relying on this claimed injury which could not be 
supported by any other evidence except the statement 
of Arthur N. Grover who claimed that this injury took 
place on September 26, 1964, two doctors were present-
ed by plaintiffs. The first was Dr. Thomas E. Robinson 
of Salt Lake City and he was asked (R. 283): 
"Q. And in October of 1964 did he come to you 
relating an incident of unconsciousness? 
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A. I think it was October. It was in that region 
or that area of time, at least, when he did." 
Then Attorney Ashton as the record from there on will 
show, attempted to use this doctor based on this incident, 
to show possible incompetentcy. When the doctor was 
cro~s-examined he was asked to produce his office book 
to establish the date of any office calls 05 treatments (R. 
297) and he said he left it at home. He admitted he ex-
pected to be cross-examined on this date. 
The other doctor was Dr. J. Gordon Felt. He never 
had Arthur N. Grover as a patient until May 15th, 1967 
( R. 315) but claims he was at a social party at Norman 
Grovers place at one time and Mr. Grover related the 
incident of him blacking out (R. 314). The very date 
that this incident was supposed to have taken place, to-
wit: September 26, 1964 (R. 77) Arthur N. Grover de-
livered to the three Garns in Fielding, Utah (Exhibit 
#33) being a brief typed contract dated that date which 
he wanted signed to bind up the agreement until Mr. 
Skeen, his attorney, could complete the final document. 
All four people signed it that day (R. 544, 545, 546, 
547' 634, 635, 636) . 
Since the signing of this contract Mr. Grover has 
filed a law suit entitled "Arthur N. Grover Farms Inc. 
vs. F. P. Nielson & Sons," Civil #9945 filed August 9, 
1965, with E. J. Skeen, at'torney for plaintiff. Answers 
to certain interrogatories are signed by Arthur N. Grov-
er before a notary E. J. Skeen as of September 10, 1965, 
and are of record in said action. 
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Neighbors and business associates who had know1: 
Mr. Grover for many years testified to his competency 
to-wit: Junior Lish, who had known him since 1956 (IL 
409) and had hauled his grain which was in storage in 
Blue Creek, to market in 1965 (R. 411). Mr. Grover 
went with him with each load until approximately 
15,000 bushels were hauled. Mr. Grover told him (R. 
412, 413, 414) of how happy he was to have made a sale 
to the Garns. He also said he could not get any of his 
children to help him, including Norman Grover (R. 
416, 417) so that is why he decided to sell the farm. 
J. Leo Nelson who was Arthur N. Grover's banker 
had known him for over 20 years (R. 441). In the fall of 
1964 Mr. Grover said he was going to sell his farm and 
Mr. Nelson asked him why he didn't sell it to his son 
Norman and he said "I can't deal with Norm" ( R. 441) . 
Mr. Nelson testified that Mr. Grover appeared to fully 
understand each and every part of what was taking place 
when the contract was signed (R. 452, 453, 454, 455) 
and he even loaned him money !)ince the execution of the 
agreement. 
Ernest Brenkman an employee of F. P. Nielson & 
Sons had known Arthur N. Grover for 28 years (R. 
615), while running a wheat elevator and during those 
times had dealt with Mr. Grover on numerous occasions. 
He purchased grain from him in May, 1965. Mr. Brenk-
man said (R. 617): 
"A. To the best of my knowledge, with my asso-
ciations prior to this, he seemed about the 
13 
same spirits, same type of gentleman we'd 
always done business with before." 
Voylet Grover, sister-in-law had known Arthur N. 
Grover for more than 52 years (R. 685). She attended a 
family reunion in 1965 where Arthur N. Grover was 
present in July of that year (R. 686). He mentioned 
about the sale of his farm to the Garns and how happy 
he was about it. She considered him competent, (R. 687, 
688, 689, 690). Each and all of the Garns considered 
him competent. 
From these facts, the court found: 
Arthur N. Grover Farms Inc. was incorporated 
March 1st, 1963, with 100 shares of stock authorized. 
That Arthur N. Grover owned 45 shares of issued stock 
and Estella V. Grover owned 45 shares of issued stock. 
One share of stock was issued to Fay G. Wight but not 
delivered until August of 1965. That Fay G. Wight 
as president and signed the stockbook in blank and deliv-
ered it to Arthur N. Grover ( R. 878) . That Arthur N. 
Grover and Estella V. Grover are the father and mother 
of all the Grover plaintiffs. That no stock had been is-
sued to any of them except Fay G. Wight, prior to Au-
gust of 1965 and none was delivered to any of them prior 
to said date (R. 879). That besides the real estate that 
had been conveyed to the corporation Arthur N. Grover 
owned personally 50 shares of Lone Spring Water Co., 
stock being one half interest in said company, 50 shares 
or rights to graze 50 head under the Taylor Grazing 
permits and certain machinery and equipment (R. 880). 
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That Arthur N. Grover and b:;Lelln \T. Grover for 
them~elves as secretary-treasurer and vice-president 
and for in behalf of Arthur N. Grover Farms Inc· 
entered into a contract of sale of certain real property 
with the Garns on certain terms and conditions set out 
in said contract (R. 880). That said sale was authorized 
by all stockholders of said corporation who had stock 
issued and in their possession. 
That Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. Grover 
were using the corporation to carry out their private 
purposes. That said corporation was formed for the pur-
pose of buying, selling and dealing in real property (R. 
880) . That in August, 1965, the children met with their 
parents and induced them to issue stock to them and 
back-date the same to show them as stockholders prior 
to the contract date of sale, to-wit: October 1st, 1964. 
That stockholders meeting were then held wherein a 
claimed resolution was passed but not reduced to writ-
ing, claiming the stockholders were not notified of the 
sale prior to its execution (R. 881). That the only shares 
issued and in the possession of any parties prior to Au-
gust 2, 1965, were 45 shares each to Arthur N. Grover 
and Estella V. Grover (R. 882). That the children of 
Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. Grover had no stock 
in their possession prior to August 2, 1965, and had no 
standing to file a class action as stockholders to attack 
the contract of sale of October 1st, 1964 (R. 882). That 
the contracts of sale and deeds were signed by the own-
ers of said corpora ti on and placed in escrow ( R. 882) . 
That the Arthur N. Grover Corporation by its officers, 
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agreed to deposit water stock certificates and grazing 
rights with escrow holder (R. 883) which have not been 
deposited. That the escrow agreement provided that the 
funds, when paid, were to be transferred to the private 
individual accounts of Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. 
Grover ( R. 883). That the sale was made in keeping 
with the purposes of the corporation (R. 883). That the 
defendants have altered their position because of said 
sale by buying equipment and have paid all sums that 
through time have become due prior to the due date (R. 
884). That the contract provided that if either party 
had to employ counsel to enforce the provisions of the 
contract the defaulting party should pay reasonable at-
torneys fees and $5,000.00 was fixed as attorneys fees. 
That no notice was ever given to the defendants prior 
to the contract date that either Arthur N. Grover or 
Estella V. Grover had no authority to enter into said 
contract ( R. 884) . That on date of sale both Arthur N. 
Grover and Estella V. Grover possessed sufficient men-
tal capacity to so enter into said agreement, fully under-
stood and exercised their own free will and were phys-
ically and mentally capable of understanding and ap-
preciating the nature and effect of the agreement. That 
the price per acre was higher than other sales but the 
interest rate was lower for a tax benefit. That any 
changes in the contract were made by E. J. Skeen, at-
torney for plaintiffs (R. 885). That the contract was 
not inadequate as to price. That said sale was not done 
in the manner as outlined by Section 16-10-74 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, but said contract 
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was not void nor of no force or effect because all of the 
stockholders of said corporation entered into and signed 
said contract and said corporation is now estopped to 
now assert that the acts of its stockholders are not bind-
ing on said corporation. That Arthur N. Grover and 
Estella V. Grover had the advice of counsel at all times. 
That there was no imposition of any other persons will 
upon the Grovers. That no fraud, deceit or undue in-
fluence was practiced upon them (R. 887). 
The court concluded that the Arthur N. Grover 
Farms Inc. was but the instrumentality through which 
Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. Grover, for conveni-
ence, transacted their business. It pierced the corporate 
veil and concluded that any statutes relating to corpora-
tions and particularly to meetings of stockholders were 
either complied with or waived when the owners of the 
stock of said corporation entered into said contract. That 
the corporation and Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. 
Grover, individually, are bound by the contract entered 
into October 1st, 1964 (R. 888) and an appropriate de-
cree was entered. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I 
THE CONTRACT OF SALE IS VALID 
BECAUSE IT 'i\T AS AUTHORIZED BY ALL 
OF THE STOCKHOLDERS 'VHO ':VERE 
THE ACTUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS. 
17 
POINT II 
THE CORPORATION SHOULD BE 
ES TOPPED FROM DENYING THE VALID-
ITY OF THE CONTRACT. 
POINT III 
THE GROVERS USED THE CORPORA-
TION FOR THEIR INDIVIDUAL PUR-
POSES, ARE PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT 
OF SALE, DID EXECUTE IT NOT ONLY AS 
INDIVIDUALS BUT ALSO AS OFFICERS 
AND DIRECTORS AND ARE PERSONALLY 
LIABLE UNDER IT. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FIND-
ING THAT THE CONTRACT OF SALE WAS 
PREPARED BY THE GROVERS AND THEIR 
ATTORNEY. 
POINT V 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND 
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONTRACT OF SALE IS VALID 
BECAUSE IT \VAS AUTHORIZED :UY ALL 
OF THE STOCKHOLDERS \VHO \VERE 
THE ACTUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS. 
POINT II 
THE CORPORATION SHOULD BE 
ESTOPPED FRO.M DENYING THE VALID-
ITY OF THE CONTRACT. 
POINT III 
THE GROVERS USED THE CORPORA-
TION FOR THEIR INDIVIDUAL PUR-
POSES, ARE PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT 
OF SALE, DID EXECUTE IT NOT ONLY AS 
INDIVIDUALS BUT ALSO AS OFFICERS 
AND DIRECTORS AND ARE PERSONALLY 
LIABLE UNDER IT. 
Points I, II and III are so interrelated that we shall 
discuss them together in order to avoid repetition. 
The essence of Points I, II and III is the fact that 
we are dealing with a "family corporation." Specifically, 
a corporation whose entire assets were transferred to it 
by Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. Grover, his wife, 
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in exchange for ninety ( 90 l shares of stock (Findings 
of Fact No. 1). This represented all of the stockholders 
of the corporation who had stock issued and in their 
possession at the time (October 1, 1964) the contract of 
sale in question was entered into (Findings of Fact No. 
6). There was only one other share of stock that had 
been issued by the corporation a.pd that had been issued 
to Fay G. Wight, a daughter, for no consideration and 
the possession of said certificate of stock was not de-
livered to Fay G. Wight until August, 1965, (Findings 
of Fact No. 1 and No. 6). It can thus be seen that the 
contract of sale was authorized and entered into by the 
holders of all of the stock of the corporation (Findings 
of Fact 19 (a) and 19 (b). 
We are not dealing with a "public corporation" 
having numerous !)tockholders. It is this distinction be-
tween the small closed family corporation and the large 
public corporation having many stockholders that the 
appellants choose to ignore. We are here dealing with a 
corporation that is nothing more than the alter-ego of 
the individuals or a mere shell covering the real parties 
in interest. Consequently we wish to confine the argu-
ment to cases of this kind and support it with cases that 
are in point with the case now before the court. 
In the case of Russell vs. Golden Rule Mining 
Company 159 P2d 776, it appears that certain parties 
entered into some agreements to purchase some mining 
claims with the right 'to install certain machinery. The 
machinery so installed would become the property of 
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sellers if default took place. After a period of time and 
after additional contracting had been done, a corpora-
tion was formed with assignments of the contracts to the 
corporation. 'Vhen default occurred, the principal stock-
holder who held a majority of the stock directed certain 
legal action to proceed in behalf of said corporation. He 
did so without a meeting of the stockholders. The court 
said on page 785, left-hand column: 
" ... A stockholder may maintain a suit on 
behalf of the corporation. Such suit may be in-
stituted without a previous demand if it appears 
that such a demand on the corporation would be 
useless or unavailing ... Furthermore, while 
the old rule WrM otherwise, it is now held that 
'the trend of authority is to uphold as binding 
on the corporation acts or contracts on its behalf 
by a person or persons owning all or practically 
all of the stock, even though there is a lack of, 
or defect in, some corporate step, or action'. 19 
C.J.S. Corporations p. 472 Art. 1004." (em-
phasis added) 
'Ve say that a calling of a meeting of the stock-
holders, Arthur N. Grover ( 45 shares) Estella V. 
Grover ( 45 shares and Fay G. 'Vight (one share) to 
pass a resolution authorizing the sale is a "useless" act. 
'Ve also say that when two people owning 90 shares out 
of 91 shares, enter into a contract of sale for the corpora-
tion, it is binding on the corporation "even though there 
is a lack of, or defect in, some corporate step or action." 
The case of Henry Building Cornpany vs. Cow-
man, 363 P2d 208 (Okl) is a case of a real estate broker 
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bringing action against two corporations for a broker's 
commission for procuring a purchaser for an apartment 
building owned by the corporations. The corporations 
defended on the ground that the contract had not been 
entered into by a formal act of the directors as provided 
by statute. On page 212 right-hand column, the court 
stated: 
" ... In her (The plaintiff's) amendment to 
petition she alleged that C. H. Henry told her 
that the corporations were family corporations 
and that he and his wife, .May Henry, owned the 
corporations and all of the stock of the corpora-
tions. 
"Under 18 O.S., 1951 Art. 1.34 supra, and 
under the general rule in external dealings with 
third persons a corporation exercises its powers 
by and through its board of directors. 19 C.J.S. 
Corporations Arts. 999 and 1000, pages 463 and 
464. However, there are exceptions to the rule. 
In 19 C.J.S. Corporations Art. 1004, page 471, 
it is said: ... ''but the trend of authority is to 
uphold as binding on the corporation acts or 
contracts on its behalf by a person or persons 
owning all or practically all of the stock . . . ' 
"In W enban Estate Inc. vs. Hewlett et al, 
193 Cal 675, 227 P.723, 731, the Supreme Court 
of California said : 
'Accordingly it has been held that upon a suf-
ficient showing that a corporation is but the in-
strumentality through which an individual, who 
is the sole owner of all of the corporate capital 
stock, for convenience transacts his business, 
equity, looking to the substance rather than the 
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form of the relation, and the law as well will 
hold such corporation obligated for the a~ts of 
the sole owner of the corporation to the same 
extent and just as he would be bound in the ab-
sence of the existence of the corporation.' (em-
phasis added) 
"In the body of tthe opinion in l\Iid-Continent 
Life Insurance Co. v. Goforth, 193 Okl. 314, 
143 P2d 154, 157, this court said: 'It is the gen-
eral rule that a corporation is an entity separate 
and apart from the persons composing it, but 
the rule has its limitations. Both law and equity, 
when necessary to circumvent fraud, protect the 
rights of third persons, and accomplish justice, 
disregard the distinct existence and treat them as 
identical.' 
See also 13 Am. Jur. Corporations, Art. 7, 
page 160, to the same effect." 
Consequently we say that in this case Arthur N. 
Grover owned 45 shares of stock, Estella V. Grover 
owned 45 shares of stock and Fay G. Wight owned one 
share but she had never received delivery of that one 
share prior to the sale (see her answers to interrogato-
ries). She had endorsed the stock certificates in blank 
for the benefit of her father and he held the stock book 
with her signing in blank all of the stock certificates, 
giving him and his wife absolute control of the corpora-
tion. The corporation had been created by Mr. and Mrs. 
Grover for the express purpose of handling their own 
property. The property in the corporation was only the 
property that they themselves had accumulated over a 
lifetime. The one share to the girl had not been delivered 
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to her. The parents had absolute control over the cor-
poration. 
New, let's refer again to Wenban Estate Inc. vs. 
Hewlett 227 P. 723. I fall back to this case bacause there 
are a whole line of cases that follow the thinking of this 
decision and we are nearly exactly in line with the facts 
in it. In the 1Venban Estate v. Hewlett) page 728 left-
hand column in the next to the last paragraph, it reads: 
" ... In June, 1908, upon the advice of Hew-
lett, the corporation was formed for the express 
purpose of taking over, managing, and develop-
ing the properties of Caroline S. Wenban. 
"At the time the corporation was organized 
9,995 shares of its 10,000 shares of corporate 
capital stock were issued direct to Caroline S. 
"\V enban. The remaining 5 shares were issued in 
order to qualify directors, I share to Caroline S. 
Wenban, I share to her daughter, Eva Shaw, I 
share to her daughter, Flora Wenban l\iills, I 
to her business agent, George \V. Merrill, and I 
share to defendant Eugene Hewlett. These 
shares were shortly thereafter indorsed by the 
persons to whom they were originally issued over 
to and delivered to Caroline S. "\Venban, who has 
ever since held them as sole owner. She controlled 
the corporation in all of its actions, and the offi-
cers of the corporation, who were members of 
her family, did whatever she wanted them to do 
with regard to the corporation." 
Again on page 731 right-hand column, it reads: 
" ... That the corporation was looked upon as 
the alter ego of Caroline S. "\Venban is evidenced 
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by the acquiescence of the other directors of the 
corporation in her conduct whereby she treated 
the bonds of the corporation as her own. In such 
a situation her responsibility as the sole share-
holder of the corporation, when dealing with the 
assets of the corporation, was the corporation's 
responsibility, and conversely the obligation of 
the corporation in this particular situation is her 
obligation." 
Now, I have shown this for the reason that in our 
case when the contract was filed with the escrow holder, 
the First Security Bank, the contract provided that all 
of the payments that were made on the sale of the prop-
erty by the corporation, were to be transferred into the 
personal accounts of Mr. and Mrs. Grover. Again, we 
have proof that the corporation is just the alter-ego of 
Mr. and Mrs. Grover and was set up to serve their indi-
vidual purposes. Let's take another quote from this 
same case, found on page 731 in the middle of the page, 
which reads: 
"'i\Thile it is the general rule that a corporation 
is an entity separate and distinct from its stock-
holders, with separate, distinct liabilities and ob-
ligations, nevertheless there is a well-recognized 
and firmly settled exception to this general rule, 
that, when necessary to redress fraud, protect 
the rights of third persons, or prevent a palpable 
injustice, the law and equity will intervene and 
cast aside the legal fiction of independent cor-
porate existence, as distinguished from those who 
hold and own the corporate capital stock, and deal 
with the corporation and stockholders as identical 
entities with identical duties and obligations. 
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"Accordingly it has been held that upon a suf-
ficient showing that a corporation is but the in-
strumentality through which an individual, who 
is the sole owner of all the corporate capital stock, 
for convenience transacts his business, equity, 
looking to the substance rather than the form of 
the relation, and the law as well, will hold such 
corporation obligated for the acts of the sole 
owner of the corporation to the same extent and 
just as he would be bound in the absence of the 
existence of the corporation .... " 
The vVenban case has been cited as authority by 
the California courts and other state courts on many, 
many occasions. One of the most recent decisions citing 
this W enban case is the 1964 California case of Brunzell 
Construction Company Inc. vs. Harrahs Club 37 Cal 
Rptr, 659. There Harrah's Club was sued for breach of 
contract and other causes of action and the court found 
that Harrah's Club was really only a one man corpora-
tion and the alter ego of the owner. The court held that 
the corporate shell must be disregarded in order to ef-
fectuate justice. On page 665 in the right-hand column, 
it reads: 
" . . Under our law where one person owns 
all of the stock of a corporation and uses the cor-
poration as a mere conduit for the transaction of 
his own business, the corporation is regarded as 
his 'alter ego'." 
Then it cites several California cases and further states: 
"To adhere to the separate corporate entity 
theory in this case would be nothing short of plac-
ing a judicial stamp of approval upon an appar-
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ent fraud - here the whole structure of the var-
ious enterprises is transparent .... " 
In another recent California case, Taylor vs. Newton, 
257 P2d 68 ( 1953) it was re-emphasized that the dis-
tinct entity of a corporation will be disregarded in order 
to achieve justice and to prevent fraud. It was said on 
page 72, left-hand column: 
" ... 'It is the law in California as elsewhere 
that, although a corporation is usually regarded 
as an entity separate and distinct from its stock-
holders, both law and equity will, when necessary 
to circumvent fraud, protect the rights of third 
persons and accomplish justice, disregard this 
distinct existence and treat them as identical.' 
The issue is not so much whether, for all pur-
poses, the corporation is the 'alter-ego' of its 
stockholders or officers, nor whether the very 
purpose of the organization of the corporation 
was to defraud the individual who is now in court 
complaining, as it is an issue of whether in the 
particular case presented and for the purposes 
of such case justice and equity can best be accom-
plished and fraud and unfairness defeated by a 
disregard of the distinct entity of the corporate 
form." 
All of these authorities go to the very point that we 
wish to impress strongly here and that is, that if the 
Grovers were allowed to deny the fact that their corpo-
ration was merely their alter ego, this court would be 
allowing a stamp of approval upon a fraud because 
clearly the Grover Corporation was formed for the very 
purpose of protecting the property of the two share-
holders of the corporation. To allow these shareholders 
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to hide behind the corporate entity and be given greater 
rights because of this corporate existence, would be to 
allow an injustice to occur, because enforcing the letter 
of the law would defeat the very spirit of the law. This 
is further emphasized in Fletcher's Encyclopedia on 
Corporations, Vol. 1 pp. 134, 136 and 165. The Cali-
fornia courts have repeatedly held that this doctrine of 
disregarding the corporate mask in searching to see who 
is the real party in interest, does not depend upon the 
presence of actual fraud. The recent California case of 
Talbot v. Fresno Pacific Corporation, 5 Cal,Rptr, 361, 
stated that very point and added: 
"It is designed to avoid or prevent what would 
be fraud or injustice, if accomplished." 
If there is any question as to when the courts should 
ignore the corporate veil and pierce it to see who are the 
real parties in interest, the California courts have also 
given us a good definition of that in the case of Minifie 
v. Rowley, 187 Calif. 481, 202 P.673. The first test is 
that the individual not only influences and governs the 
corporation but there is such a unity of interest and 
ownership that the individuality or separateness of the 
person or the corporation has ceased. Second that the 
facts are such that an adherence to the fiction of a sep-
arate existence of the corporation would, under the par-
ticular circumstances, sanction a fraud or promote in-
justice. There can be no question but what those two 
criteria have been met in our case. Here the individuals 
had such a unity with the corporation that the corpora-
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tion and the stockholders were one. And, certainly the 
second criteria is present, that if the court did not dis-
regard the fact that the plaintiffs and the corporation 
are one, it would promote an injustice. 
Now, let us look at the sections of the statutes 
themselves. We believe that Section 16-10-74, UCA 
1953, as amended which is the section which the plain-
tiffs want to hang their hat on, is really controlled by 
Section 16-10-6, UCA 1953 as amended, under the 
heading of Defense of Ultra Vires. This section pro-
vides that: 
"No act of a corporation and no conveyance or 
transfer of real or personal property to or by a 
corporation shall be invalid by reason of the fact 
that the corporation was without capacity or 
power to do such act or to make or receive such 
f " conveyance or trans er, ... 
Mr. Ashton always has claimed that this section has no 
reference at all to Section 16-10-74. However, we note 
that as a footnote to this section the editor has referenced 
it to 58 ALR 2d 784: 
"Who may assert invalidity of sale, mortgage, 
or other disposition of corporate property with-
out approval of stockholders." 
This ALR reference states in a preliminary section at 
page 786: 
"Statutes commonly require stockholder ap-
proval of alienations of the property of corpora-
tions. Sometimes they relate to transfers of all or 
substantially all of the corporate assets; " 
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In other words, the editors of the Utah Code An-
notated have reference under 16-10-6 the very matters 
controlling the provisions of 16-10-7 4 and the interest-
ing thing in this, is that on page 788 of the ALR Anno-
tation they have included a section under the heading: 
"General Rule that Statute is for Benefit of Stock-
holders Only" - "Who May Assert Invalidity of 
Transfer." In Section 3, Stockholders, it reads: 
"It is generally recognized that a charter or 
general statute requiring the consent of a per-
centage of the stockholders to validate a sale, 
mortgage, or other disposition of corporate prop-
erty is intended primarily for the benefit of the 
stockholders, and it has been held or recognized 
in many decisions that only they can complain of 
the failure of the corporation to comply with this 
requirement." 
Now, if this be the case that on the 1st day of Oc-
tober, 1964, there were 91 shares of stock issued with 
45 belonging to the father and another 45 belonging to 
the mother and one share was issued to a daughter, but 
not delivered and the daughter had been willing to sign 
in blank the stock certificate book so the father and 
mother could handle their property as they saw fit, then 
the father and mother, Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. 
Grover, are the only persons who have any right to ap-
pear in court and assert any claim or objection under 
the statute. And, inasmuch as they own all of the stock, 
equity would not let them hide behind that statute and 
complain because they personally executed the docu-
ments themselves. 
30 
Also there is an important distinction between a 
large widely-held corporation with many stockholders 
and this type of family corporation where the stock is 
held by the heads of the family and the corporation is 
created and formed to carry out their purposes. They 
are not considered the same by the law as corporations 
which are commercial in character and have numerous 
stockholders and operate as big business. 
I think if the court will look at the cases cited by 
the plaintiff it will find that each and all of the cases 
involve large corporations with many shares of stock 
outstanding. I think it will also find that the action 
involved in those cases was between the stockholders 
who were attempting to restrain or enjoin and was not 
one in rescission. I believe it will be found in each 
instance that the act had not been executed but was 
threatened and the position of the parties had not 
changed. Now, with this thought in mind we want to 
cite to the court a number of additional cases. 
Dealing with the issue of the statutory requirement 
that a corporation cannot sell its assets until there has 
been a meeting of the shareholders to grant authority 
to the directors to sell said assets, it should first be 
stated that the common law rule was very similar. The 
common law rule stated that the directors had no 
authority to sell the assets of a corporation until the 
shareholders gave their approval. The Utah statute 
in question, Section 16-10-74 UCA 1953 as amended, 
merely codifies the common law rule but it is the rea-
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soning behind the statute which is important, and the 
policy which is sought to be enforced. From an exami-
nation of this we can determine what was the intent 
of the statute. Certainly the same philosophy which 
caused common law judges to develop this rule is the 
same which prompted the creators of the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act to provide the similar provision 
which is an attempt to protect the shareholders from 
irresponsible acts of the directors or from acts which 
would benefit the directors at the expense of the share-
holders. 
But, as in all rules, some exceptions were developed. 
Both the common law and the other state statutes have 
allowed exceptions which stated that where the directors 
of a corporation own all or nearly all of the outstanding 
stock, then the acts of these individuals can be con-
strued to be the acts of the shareholders and with the 
consent of the shareholders; any other interpretation 
of such a rule would be to place form over substance. 
To allow a strict interpretation of the law would 
defeat the letter and purpose of the law. A long line 
of California cases have expressed such a theory. One 
case directly in point is that of Halbert vs. Berlinger, 
273 P2d 27 4, 1954 case. In this case a husband and 
wife owned all of the corporation's stock. The wife took 
no part in the corporation's management and the hus-
band was the president and executive officer of the 
corporation. The husband was more than a mere agent 
and his acts as president, in furthering the objectives 
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of the corporation, were binding upon the corporation 
itself. In that case the corporation president was pilot-
ing a plane which crashed and a passenger was killed. 
The plaintiff in this action sued the corporation for 
negligence. The jury found the corporation president 
was acting in pursuance of the corporation interests 
and therefore represented the corporation and was not 
a mere agent. On appeal the court held that the jury 
could reasonably infer that the corporation president 
had unrestricted and unlimited authority to act for the 
corporation in furthering its objectives. In our case 
it is clear that the executive secretary of the corpora-
tion, 1\-lr. Grover, was acting in pursuance of the cor-
poration's interests and he and his wife owned all of 
the stock so any acts he performs in his official capacity 
must be binding upon the corporation. 
Another California case, Herring v. Fisher, 242 
P2d 963 ( 1952) case held that a corporation officer 
whose specific duty was to guide the corporation and 
seek to further its interests could bind the corporation 
by his acts. There, the court held that the defendant, 
Fisher, was a spokesman for the corporation and pos-
sibly even its alter ego. In his correspondence with the 
respondent he never referred to the corporation. The 
president did not require written authority to make a 
sale or to employ an agent to do so. The court here 
also held the executive officer of such a corporation 
is more than an agent. He acts and speaks for the cor-
poration in furthering its express objects and may 
sell all the properties of this corporation because that 
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is the very object of its organization. In this case it was 
a corporation which engaged in the sale of properties. 
A similar holding was stated in the case of J eppi 
v. Brockman Holding Company, 34 Cal 2d 11, 206 
P2d 847, 9 ALR 2d 1297. In that case the court recites 
the common law rule that the directors of an ordinary 
corporation could not dispose of all the assets without 
the consent of its stockholders. They cite the California 
statute which allows the corporation to dispose of its 
assets and wind up its business when authorized by 
a majority vote of the outstanding stock, rather than 
a unanimous vote. In this case the executive officer of 
the corporation, as in our case, agreed to make a sale 
with some buyer, entered into the transaction and later 
tried to withdraw from the agreement. The buyer 
instituted an action to force the sellers to continue with 
their agreement and the court upheld the agreement 
requiring the sellers to pa~s title to the property. There 
was no meeting of the shareholders. In our case there 
was a meeting of the shareholders as well as the direc-
tors, since they were all one group and the same people. 
But, the court in this California case expressly held 
that a corporation's sale of all its assets in the ordinary 
course of business for which it was organized, without 
the stockholders' consent, is not ultra vires. This is 
exactly what we have done-had a sale of the corporate 
assets in the ordinary course of the corporate purposes. 
'Vhen the Grovers found it was to their interest, which 
was also the corporation's interest, to sell some assets, 
then they, as this California court held, did not need to 
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have a stockholders meeting. That case, like ours, in-
volves a statute. The court stated this, page 1302, right-
hand column: 
"The corporation relies upon Section 343 of 
the Civil Code, now Section 3901, Corporations 
Code, which reads: 'No corporation shall sell ... 
all or substantially all of its property and assets 
. . · unless under authority of a resolution of 
its board of directors and with the approval of 
the principal terms of the transaction and the 
nature and amount of the consideration by vote 
or written consent of (the) shareholders .. .' " 
There is no question that the shareholders did not 
meet formerly. It was never contended they did, but the 
court did hold that where it was clear they were pur-
suing a corporate policy and interest, that any decision 
of the executive officers and the directors was binding 
upon the corporation and they would not be allowed 
to repudiate a contract on a technicality simply for the 
purpose of enforcing the strict letter of the law. Such 
a holding would def eat the very intent of the statute 
and would create an injustice. The court goes on to 
explain why it held as it did and states, page 1303, 
lef thand column: 
"The provisions of the statute should not be 
applied solely upon the basis of the quantity of 
the property; the test which determines the ques-
tion of the necessity for consent of the stockholder 
is, 'whether the sale is in the regular course of the 
business of the corporation and in furtherance of 
the express objects of its existence, or something 
outside of the normal and regular course of the 
business .... " 
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It is the contention of the defendants that the purposes 
of the Grover Corporation are buying, selling and ex-
changing property, which they were doing here. 
One of the issues before the court at this time is 
the issue of whether o! not a corporation can validly 
sell its stock or assets without first holding a share-
holders meeting where there is a state statute that such 
a meeting be held. That exact issue has been considered 
in the American Law Reports at 9 ALR 2d 1306, and 
particularly in Section 3 on page 1312 ,Section 3 reads: 
"Particular classes of corporations or corpo-
rations organized for particular purposes; buying 
and selling real estate. Statutes requiring ap- , 
proval by a specified percentage of the stock-
holders in a corporation in order to validate a 
sale of all or part of its business, franchise or 
property have been held inapplicable to sales of 
all or a part of their real estate by corporations 
engaged in a general real-estate business; there-
fore, such sales have been uphold notwithstanding 
the fact that there was no attempt to proceed in 
accordance with the terms of such a statute." 
Our Section 16-10-6 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, supports this theory. Then several cases are 
cited which hold this very point, that is, that in a certain · 
type of case there is no necessity to comply with the 
statutory requirement of first holding a stockholders 
meeting because the very purpose for which the cor-
pora ti on was organized is being furthered by the sale 
of the assets. There can be no question in our case but 
what one of the main purposes for which this corpo-
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ration was organized by Grovers was for the sale of 
real estate. Exhibit #10 is the Articles of Incorporation 
of the Grover Corporation and Article 3 thereof reads: 
"This corporation is organized for the purpose 
of engaging in farming and in buying and sell-
ing, exchanging, leasing and renting real and 
personal property of every kind and description." 
(emphasis added) 
While the plaintiffs contend that this corporation 
is organized primarily for the purpose of farming, they 
cannot deny the fact that right in their own Articles 
of Incorporation they state that in addition to farming 
the corporation is organized for the purpose of buying 
and selling real estate and personal property of every 
kind and description. Certainly that statement is too 
broad to be limited to farming purposes only, for it 
clearly goes beyond that limited purpose. It also benefits 
the corpora ti on shareholders by allowing and proposing 
the sale of property when it would so benefit the share-
holders. 
The ALR Annotation cites cases in California, New 
York, North Carolina, Ohio and Wisconsin and a more 
recent supplement edition to that annotation found in 
I Later Case Service, ALR 2d at page 950 cites addi-
tional cases in Washington and California. 
All these cases reach the same important con-
clusion and that is that where the purposes of the cor-
poration are being furthered by the sale, the statutory 
requirement that the shareholders meet together to 
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hold a meeting to discuss if the sale should be author-
ized or not is meaningless and need not be complied 
with. The Articles of Incorporation of the Grover 
Corporation clearly state what its purposes are and 
one of them is to sell property. 
Looking now to some of these cases that are cited 
let us first look at the California case of Bradford v. 
Sunset Land and Water Company, 157 P. 20, 30, 
Cal. App. 87, which held, where there is a statute de-
claring that no sale, transfer, etc., of the "business 
franchise and property as a whole" of any corporation 
in the state should be valid without the consent of the 
stockholders of record who hold at least 2/3rds of 
the issued and capital stock of the corporation, the 
statute was not applicable to a contract by which a 
corpora ti on engaged in a general real estate business 
gave an option for the purchase of real estate belonging 
to it. 
A very similar holding was in the California case 
of Seeburg v. El Royale Corporation, 54 Cal.App.2d 
I, 128 P2d 362. There the court held that an option 
to purchase an apartment house from a corporation 
was not void even though the consent of the corporation 
stockholders was not first obtained as required by a 
California statute which read: 
"A corporation must first have a stockholders 
meeting before it could dispose of all or substan-
tially all of its property." 
That case held the very thing we are trying to point 
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out here, that where the purpose of the corporation is 
being furthered and effectuated by the sale there is 
no reason to require the stockholders to personally grant 
approval. At this point let us refer back to the earlier 
California case of J eppi v. Brockman Holding Com-
pany cited earlier, where the California Supreme Court 
held there was no need to meet the requirement for a 
stockholders meeting, and that the option granted by 
the officers of the corporation to buy real estate was 
valid even though the statute expressly required a 
stockholders meeting before such sale could be made. 
In that said case there was one interesting difference 
from the other cases cited and that is that there it was 
not a realty company making the sale or a corporation 
expressly organized for the purpose of selling real 
estate, rather it was organized for the purpose of 
disposing of the assets of an estate. The court con-
cluded that the sale was furthering the corporation's 
purpose. On page 1314 of this ALR Annotation there 
was another very interesting comment in the righthand 
column, halfway down, which states: 
"It may be noted in this connection that the 
principles stated and illustrated above with re-
spect to corporations engaging in the real-estate 
business generally has also been applied in a few 
cases where, in addition to being organized for 
purposes other than the buying and selling of real 
estate generally, the corporation was ~uthorized 
in connection with its corporate activities to pur-
chase and sell real estate." (emphasis added) 
Now, that goes right to the point of our case. The 
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plaintiffs contend that their corporation was organized 
only for farming purposes, not to buy and sell real 
estate. Now, even if that were true we do not agree 
that the same rule would apply according to this article. 
It cites several cases which have upheld the point that 
where even one of the several purposes for which a 
corporation was organized was to buy and sell real 
estate, even though its primary purpose was for some 
other goal, that then the same reasoning applies. They 
conclude that in such a case there is no reason to 
require a stockholders' meeting to authorize the sale 
even though a statute require!) one. For example, the 
'i\T ashington case of Lange vs. Reservation Mining 
and Smelting Co., 48 Wash. 167, 93 P. 208, held that 1 
a corporation which was organized among other things 
to buy, sell and deal in mines, had the power to enter 
into a contract for the sale of its mines together with 
the tools and machinery used in operating them, the 
same being all the property owned by the corporation. 
This was allowed, notwithstanding the objection of 
the minority stockholders. The court pointed out that 
the sale did not disrupt the corporation nor was it con-
trary to the purpose for which the corporation was 
formed. The court further stated that on the contrary, 
the corporation would be in as good a condition to pro-
ceed with the objects it was formed to promote after 
the sale as it was before the sale would fulfill one of 
its objects and purposes, and that the power of sale 
existed by virtue of both the Articles of lncorpora tion 
and the general law confirming the management and 
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control of the corporate business on the Board of 
Trustees. This case was expressly followed in the later 
case of Smith v. Flathead River Coal Company, 6u 
Wash. 408, 119 P. 858· No single point could be more 
important than the conclusions in these cases. Again, 
in the California case of Keck Enterprises Inc. vs. 
Braunschweiger, in the District Court of California, 
108 F.Supp. 925, it was held that where there was a 
statute barring the corporate sale of all, or substan-
tially all assets without the authority of the directors 
and the consent of the stockholders it did not apply in 
a case where the prei)ident of the corporation sold a 
major asset, games, because the sale was in the regular 
course of business of the corporation and the principal 
assets of the corporation was ownership of invention 
rights, not of games. 
Numerous other cases have upheld the same point, 
however, to cite only a few, see for example an Ohio 
case, Painter v. Brainard-Cedar Realty Company, 28 
Ohio App. 123, 163 N.E. 57, which held that where 
there was an 6hio statute forbidding the sale of the 
entire property and assets of the corporation, except 
when authorized by three-fourths of the directors, and 
approval by the holders of three-fourths of the stock, 
did not apply to a sale by a corporation which was 
organized for the purpose of buying, selling and deal-
ing in real estate. The court then stated that it was 
meaningless to require the stockholders or directors to 
authorize the very thing that the corporation was or-
ganized to do. 
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Another case is Tuttle vs. Junior Building Cor-
poration, 227 N.C. 146, 41 SE.2d 365, where the object 
for which the corporation was formed was: 
"To purchase a certain designated parcel of 
real estate, to own, operate, lease, transfer, as-
sign, sell and convey this real property and/ or to 
otherwise dispose of the same and to purchase 
and/or otherwise acquire real and personal prop-
erty." 
(Almost the same exact wording of the Arti-
cles of Incorporation of the Grover Corpora-
tion.) 
Just as in our case, here the corporation tried to deny 
its duty to fulfill a contract for the sale of property ) 
entered into on its behalf by its executives, because 
there had not been a meeting of the stockholders to give 
approval to such sale as was required by a statute, 
but the court held that the statute was not applicable, 
pointing out that under its charter it appeared that 
the corporation had general power to buy and sell real 
estate as its regular business. The specific mention of 
the building and lot in question did not exempt it from 
such power or segregate it from such property acquired 
generally for such purpose. 
In a vVisconsin case, Gottschalk V• Avalon Realty 
Company, 249 Wis. 78, 23 NW.2d 606, it held that 
there was a legitimate exception to the general rule 
which should be made in the case of corporations 
created for the purpose of selling, buying, leasing and 
otherwise disposing of real estate because that was the 
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very purpose for which they were created. In a later 
case in Wisconsin, Fontaine v. Brown County Motors 
Company, 251 Wis. 433, 29 NW2d, 744, 174 ALR G94, 
the court stated: 
"We do not agree with the contention that an 
ordinary business corporation may not transfer 
real property without a majority vote of its stock-
holders. At the common law, a business corpora-
tion other than a real estate corporation was not 
permitted to dispose of its entire property exce2t 
by unanimous consent of the stockholders, if the 
corporation were a solvent going concern. The 
same was true of the conveyance of any part of 
the corporate property which was essential to a 
continuance of the corporate enterprise. 
"The basis for the limitation of authority was 
that such a conveyance was a substantial aband-
onment of the business enterprise and contrary to 
the implied agreement of the stockholders that 
the corporate property would be devoted to the 
prosecution of corporate purposes." 
As a final case let us look at a New York decision, 
lpstein v. Gonneen, 235 App.Div. 33, 256 NYS 49, 
which held that a New York statute which required 
that there would be a stockholders meeting which would 
require a two-thirds vote in favor of allowing the cor-
poration to sell and convey its property rights, privi-
leges and franchises or any interest therein, or any 
part thereof, does not apply to a contract for the sale 
of real estate by a corporation whose business was 
the sale of its own real estate. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FIND-
ING THAT THE CONTRACT OF SALE \VAS 
PREPARED BY THE GROVERS AND THEIR, 
ATTORNEY. 
The contract that the court by its findings held 
was prepared by the Grovers and Attorney E. J. Skeen 
is Exhibit #3, dated October lst, 1964 (R. 880 Find-
ings of Fact #5) and not Exhibit #33 dated September 
26, 1964, which is referred to in appellants' brief. 
The Garns claimed this was brought to their home 
place in Fielding on the date it bears by Mr. Arthur, 
N. Grover, who claimed his attorney was away and 
he wanted something signed up until the final draft 
could be prepared by Attorney Skeen. (R. 544, 545, 
546, 547, 634, 635 and 636) . They did not know who 
made it up. Exhibit #3 was finally prepared and be-
came the contract that is sought to be set aside. Mr. , 
Nelson, the banker; denied that he made it up (Ex-
hibit #33) and claimed he only became aware of it 
shortly before the trial (R. 472). Mr. Skeen (R. 771) 
claims he saw it for the first time when Mr. Grover 
brought it into his office. He claims he has searched 1 
his off ice and can't find the original ( R. 772) ; the 
present Exhibit #33 being a copy. He admitted on 
cross-examination, however, that he does not have com-
plete files, that Mr. Grover had other counsel for a year 
or two and took his files ( R. 777) . 
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It appears to the writer that Point IV involves 
a matter that has no bearing on this lawsuit. It talks 
of a contract that was superseded by another that be-
came the official document involved in the action and 
that the comment made in regard to Exhibit #33 is 
just a smokescreen thrown in, in an attempt to cloud 
the issues. We will not pursue it further. 
POINT V 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
ARE CLEARLY SUPPORTED BY THE 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND 
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. 
This court has repeatedly held that where the lower 
court heard the matter without the aid of a jury and 
had the opportunity to see and observe as well as hear 
the witnesses give their testimony, that the findings 
of the lower court will not be disturbed unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates against its findings, or 
there ha~ been a plain abuse of discretion or the lower 
court has misapplied proven facts. Bear River State 
Bank v. Merrill, 120 P2d 325, IOI Ut. 176; Beezley 
v. Beezley, 296 P2d 274, 5 Ut.2d 20; Heiselt V· Heiselt, 
349 P2d 175, IO Ut. 2nd 126; Jewell v. Horner, 366 
P2d 594, 12 Ut. 2d 328. 
We have set out carefully in our statement of facts 
references to testimony given at the trial in support 
of each and every finding of the court. We believe 
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that a careful reading of the record will reveal the fact 
that the great weight of the testimony supports the 
court's findings. 
SUMMARY 
We believe the evidence shows that Mr. Grover, 
acting for himself and wife, through the corporation 
that they owned, obtained a price that was very good. 
He in all of the dealings in behalf of the sellers was 
sharp and shrewd. He took advantage of the tax he 
would have had to pay as the farm would be paid for, 
of having a high price per acre, which could be count- ~ 
ered with the capital gain and a low rate of interest 
that he must show as regular income. Prior to this sale he 
had had the farm listed with real estate people for ap-
proximately a year. Mr. Grover, who has done all of the 
business for his wife and himself up to the time of sale, 
took care of his business after the sale in the same , 
manner as he had done before. He dealt with different 
bankers; sold his produce; did his own banking; brought 
other lawsuits; continued to file annual reports for the 
corporation. He was sharp and alert and knew what 
he was doing. It was not until nearly a year after the ' 
sale that the family, through the determined efforts 
of Norman Grover, finally convinced the parents to try 
and set the sale aside. After the family joined forces, 
their efforts knew no bounds. The stock manipulation, 
that was a'ttempted when the family united for this 
purpose, was crude and made in the face of other instru-
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ments that had been made a matter of public record 
in the Secretary of State's Office. These instruments in 
the Secretary of State's Office had not been taken into 
consideration by them but plainly pointed out that a 
new issue of stock had taken place and been back-dated. 
In attempting to rescind the contract the Grovers were 
trying to take this farm away ~rom individuals who, 
in good faith, had bought it and who have spent up-
wards of $45,000.00 for new machinery and since the 
purchase have paid even a much greater sum than that 
on the purchase price. In addition, they have spent 
four good years of their lives in farming and developing, 
building and operating this farm. 
F::.-om the facts and the equities in the entire matter 
the decision of the lower court should be affirmed. The 
corporation, Arthur N. Grover and Estella V. Grover, 
are just as well off as they ever were: They are receiv-
ing and will receive money in equal value to the land 
that they sold. By affirming the decision of the lower 
court the Garns would be protected from the unwar-
ranted effort made by Norman Grover, a stranger to 
the entire transaction to have the sale set aside, and 
justice would prevail. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Walter G. Mann and 
Reed W. Hadfield 
of Mann and Hadfield 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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